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The transaction costs perspective on costs and benefits of 
government regulation: extending the standard cost model 
Frank A.G. den Butter, Marc de Graaf and André Nijsen1 2 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the feasibility to extend the Standard Cost Model (SCM) for 
calculating the costs of government regulation by taking all transaction costs into 
account which stem from the principal/agent relationship between regulatory authorities 
and economic entities. From that perspective these transaction costs do not only relate 
to the bonding costs of the regulated entities – part of these costs can be regarded as the 
administrative burden of regulation for the private sector – but also to the monitoring 
costs of the regulators and to the residual loss. These latter costs can be regarded as cost 
to society due to e.g. miscommunication on the aims of regulation, and are, of course, 
hard to quantify. A cost calculation using the (extended) SCM presumes that the 
regulatory rules are given and set autonomously by the regulatory authorities. However, 
it may be welfare enhancing if regulations are fashioned in such a way that net benefits 
are optimized. From that perspective the paper looks at the possibility to select optimal 
regulation by means of a cost benefit analysis. A major argument is that the benefits of 
regulatory measures, e.g. to internalize external effects, comprise avoiding societal costs 
associated with no or less regulation. 
 
Keywords: bonding costs, compliance costs, monitoring costs, welfare effects of 
government regulation 
JEL-codes: D73, D78, H11, H83
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The transaction costs perspective on costs and benefits of 
government regulation: extending the standard cost model 
 
1. Introduction 
In many OECD countries the costs of government regulation is a topic of concern. The 
complaint is that government regulation brings too high compliance costs for the 
business sector and is often inefficient. These costs hamper economic activity. Part of 
these compliance costs is the administrative burden, the costs of the business sector to 
inform the government sector. Tang and Verweij (2004) show that a decrease of the 
administrative burden of 25% leads to an increase of 1.7% in real GDP of the European 
Union. A reason for concern also is that a growing part of the administrative burden is 
the direct result of European legislation.  
The size of the administrative burden from existing government regulation can be 
calculated by the Standard Cost Model (SCM) (Nijsen and Vellinga 2002, Nijsen 2003, 
Nijsen 2008). This is an activity based accounting model that aggregates the costs for 
businesses with respect to all direct costs of complying with legal information 
obligations. The focus of the SCM is on providing indicators for the administrative 
burden of government regulation at the macro level (costs for all laws) and at the micro 
level (costs for one law), which is a useful device in policy discussions on the size of 
that burden (macro level) and on reduction policies (micro level).   
However, information obligations contribute to the achievement of the related public 
goals in an indirect way only. The costs of businesses involved in providing the required 
information in order to facilitate monitoring by the government are just part of total 
business costs of government regulation. In order to comply with substantive and 
financial obligations by businesses or civilians in a direct way, e.g. to take care of safe 
labour circumstances or minimizing CO2 pollution, according to the legal standards or 
paying the due income tax, further costs have to be made. These costs relate to the direct 
achievement of the public goals themselves. Aggregation of the costs over all relevant 
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information obligations, financial obligations and substantive obligations yields an 
estimate of total direct compliance costs of government regulation for the regulated part 
of the business sector, the so called norm addressees. Besides direct compliance costs of 
the regulated businesses or norm addressees, there also are secondary or indirect 
compliance effects for the economy as a whole. See Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Business Effects of regulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper discusses the feasibility of the measurement of these costs of government 
regulation from the transaction cost perspective. It appears that government regulation 
brings about a number of transaction costs, which are deliberately not included in the 
calculation of the original version of the SCM, as they are not regarded direct 
information costs of government regulation, and therefore are not part of what is 
commonly considered as administrative burden.  
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The first aim of the paper is to extend the SCM to include all transaction costs of 
government regulation, viz. substantive compliance costs, financial costs of businesses, 
secondary compliance effects for the whole business sector (see Figure 1), and 
enforcing costs of related governmental institutions. The SCM calculations of the costs 
associated with government regulation take the existing government regulation as given. 
It is to be noted that the SCM can be used as tool to reduce the administrative burden as 
much as possible without questioning the related public goals. A major feature of this 
analysis is that the transaction costs of government regulation are supposed to stem 
from the principal/agent relation where the regulator is the principal, and the economic 
entity or the regulated business which should comply with the regulation, is the agent. 
However, the transaction costs perspective also allows considering government 
regulation from the viewpoint of economic welfare. In general, government regulation 
purports to enhance economic welfare by internalizing negative externalities, e.g. in the 
case of environmental regulation or prescriptions on working conditions. Here the 
concern is about the design of the regulation which should be optimal in the sense that 
the welfare gains of internalizing the externalities should be higher than the costs of 
regulation. Therefore, the second aim of the paper is to develop a methodology which 
considers costs and benefits of government regulation. In this methodology the costs are 
to be calculated by the extended SCM for various alternative ways of regulation.  
The content of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief 
description of the Standard Cost Model and explains its methodology by a numerical 
example. Section 3 focuses on the different types of transaction costs which can be 
distinguished in the principal/agent model, compared to the types of compliance costs 
which stem from the SCM. It also shows how the SCM can be extended by including 
these transaction costs, which are often ‘soft’ transaction costs and difficult to quantify. 
Section 4 gives the cost/benefit perspective on government regulation. Finally, section 5 
concludes. 
2. Description of the Standard Cost Model 
The Standard Cost Model measures the administrative burden of government regulation 
for businesses. A major reason for the development of the model is that from 1994 
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onwards the Dutch government is aiming at a considerable reduction of these 
informational requirements businesses have to meet. The model is to provide a 
quantitative assessment of the total administrative burden of government regulation so 
that it can be tracked how successful the reduction of the burden is. A main feature of 
the SCM is that the model starts with measuring the administrative burdens of every 
single information obligation (IO). The availability of this detailed information allows 
for effective reduction policies. EIM developed a first version of the model which is 
called Mistral® from 1992-1994 (Nijsen 2003). The Standard Cost Model (SCM) is a 
follow up to this first version and is now used by many EU-Member States and OECD-
countries (IPAL 2003, International SCM Network 2004 and 2005b, OECD 2003, 
Boeheim et.al., 2006, European Commission, 2007) as standard methodology to 
calculate the administrative burden.  
Administrative burdens are all direct costs that arise from information obligations (IOs) 
stemming from government regulation. These are obligations to prepare information 
and to hand it over to a public authority. An information obligation consists of data 
requirements that have to be reported. Examples of IOs of businesses are data 
requirements related to applying for permits and licences, or registering, or making tax 
declarations, or reporting accidents, hiring, firing and sickness of employees, or 
cooperating with inspections, etc. IOs are enforced legally and therefore they cannot be 
declined. As opposed to Mistral®, in most countries that implement the SCM, the 
administrative burden includes the costs of handing information over to third parties, so 
called third party disclosures. Third parties are consumers, clients, employees or other 
firms. Examples of third party disclosures are labeling of products, price tags or 
financial and medical leaflets.3  
2.1 The Standard Cost Model 
The Standard Cost Model measures administrative burdens by estimating the costs of 
complying with the information obligations, assuming a normally efficient way of 
compliance. This has two implications. Firstly, SCM does not purport to calculate actual 
costs that businesses make in order to meet the informational requirements of 
government regulation. If compliance to government regulation and/or collecting data 
on compliance is inefficient, this inefficiency is not regarded being part of the 
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administrative burden. The argument is that it is not the responsibility of the 
government whether businesses comply with in an efficient way or not. Competition 
will force businesses to comply with in an efficient way. Secondly, the main stream 
SCM implementations only reckon with costs for businesses which are directly related 
to the information compliance and reporting issues of government regulation. So the 
main stream implementations of the SCM do not aim at estimating: 
• the substantive compliance costs of regulated businesses 
• the financial compliance costs of regulated businesses 
• the secondary compliance effects for the non-regulated businesses 
• enforcing costs for the government4  
• and they also do not include the benefits that government regulation brings to 
society, inclusive the regulated businesses  
The SCM starts with calculating the costs of providing information with respect to one 
data requirement, the so called information obligation (IO). Here the following 
simplified accounting rule is applied: 
Price = Tariff * Time 
The parameter ‘Tariff’ can be calculated in two different ways. One way is using an 
internal tariff, in the case that the internal employees handle the IO. This parameter is 
set equal to the costs of a single hour of work of the internal employee. The other way is 
to use an external tariff, in the case of outsourcing the IO. The tariff is the commercial 
cost of a single hour of work of the external employee. 
The parameter ‘Time’ is the actual number of hours which a business needs in order to 
comply with the IO in a normally efficient way. 
The ‘Price’ is the product of the Tariff and the Time. It gives the costs of a single IO in 
one business which is dealt with only once. Therefore the second step in the SCM is to 
aggregate these costs for the number of times that piece of information has to be 
delivered by the relevant part of the business sector, the regulated businesses or the 
norm addressees. There are two situations to reckon with when calculating the number 
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of times an IO has to be performed in one year. Firstly, in case of calendar driven IOs 
and secondly in case of event driven IOs.  
In formula: 
Quantity 1 (calendar driven IOs) = Number of regulated businesses * Periodicity in one year 
Quantity 2 (event driven IOs) = Number of events in one year for all regulated businesses5 
The ‘Number of regulated businesses’ is the number of the norm addressees, that need 
to comply with the IO. The ‘Periodicity’ is the number of times that a norm addressee 
needs to deliver the information within a year, e.g. every day, every month, every 
quarter, once per year or once every five years. An example of a periodicity dependent 
IO is the VAT declaration or applying for a license. An example of an event driven IO 
is the reporting of labour accidents or sickness of employees. In this case, it is not 
necessary to know the average number of events per norm addressee. It will be 
sufficient to know the total number of events for all the regulated businesses. The total 
administrative burden for such a single IO is now measured as  
Administrative Burden = Price * Quantity 
so that 
Administrative Burden Calendar driven IO = Price * Quantity 1 = (Tariff * Time) * (Number of 
regulated businesses * Periodicity in one year) 
Administrative Burden Event driven IO = Price * Quantity 2 = (Tariff * Time) * (Number of events in one 
year for all regulated businesses) 
Obviously, an impression of the total administrative burden of government regulation 
can be obtained by adding up the administrative burdens of all IOs. In this way, the 
methodology also provides insight in the relative sizes of the burdens with respect to 
various IOs and related regulations. It shows which IOs and regulations bring about a 
heavy burden and are the first to be considered for a change. 
2.2 Valuing the SCM parameters 
How are the parameters of the SCM determined in practice? And what does it imply for 
the scope of the estimate of the aggregate burden? The parameter ‘Tariff’ is measured in 
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an indirect way by interviewing businesses. It is asked which kinds of employees are 
most likely required to perform the activities in order to comply with the IO. Then, in 
calculations the tariffs for these employees are derived from the National Statistics for 
wages and labour costs according to function levels. 
‘Time’ can be estimated in two ways. It can be measured also by interviewing 
businesses or experts, and alternatively it can be measured by using the ‘stopwatch-
method’. The stopwatch-method is the most time consuming and costly of the two 
estimation methods. Therefore the estimate of ‘Time’ is usually obtained by 
interviewing businesses or experts. 
The parameters ‘Number of businesses’, ‘Periodicity’ and ‘Number of events’ can be 
measured (i) by reading the law or regulation; (ii) by consultation of registers kept by 
government bodies or statistics, or (iii) by a survey. 
2.3 An example 
In order to illustrate how the SCM methodology works in practice this subsection 
summarizes the measurement of the administrative burden concerning the EU directive 
96/35/EG for The Netherlands. The costs of this directive are assessed by the 
international SCM network (2005b) based on the SCM. The directive sets requirements 
for the qualification of safety advisors who are responsible for preventing risks involved 
in transportation of hazardous goods. Any company that is transporting hazardous 
goods is forced by law to have a safety advisor, who is required to have a certificate. 
This safety advisor can be an external safety advisor as well. It is calculated that when 
the safety advisor is an internal advisor, the advisor will spend 30% of his time on the 
safety obligation and 70% of his time on his other work within the business. Three 
activities of these safety advisors bring about costs. It will be demonstrated that not all 
these costs are considered being administrative burdens according to the SCM. The first 
costs relate to keeping the certificate (i): the certificate is valid for 5 years and after this 
period the safety advisor has to follow a new course that lasts for 2 days and costs 450 
euro. Keeping the certificate is not an information obligation but a substantive 
obligation. The distinction between information obligations and substantive obligations 
has been accentuated more recently, because of the desired extension of the SCM to 
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substantive obligations. The other two activities are reporting accidents (ii) and making 
annual reports (iii). The costs of activities (ii) and (iii) belong to the administrative 
burden, being the costs to comply with information obligations (IOs).  
Table 1 shows how the costs of these two activities translate to the parameters of the 
SCM methodology. Adding these costs for all businesses who should comply with the 
regulation gives the total administrative burden of this regulation in the Netherlands, 
which in this case amounts to 7.1 million Euros. We note that in this case the total 
number of reported accidents within one year was not available. Therefore, in variance 
with the SCM methodology, here the average time per year for one business necessary 
to report all the accidents in one year, is presented in the table and not the time 
necessary to report just one accident. In doing so, there is a serious risk of substantial 
error margins and no control of the desired focus on efficient compliance. Yet, as 
mentioned before, the direct costs of prevention of accidents to happen, the so called 
substantive compliance costs are not included in this SCM calculation of the 
administrative burden.  
2.4 A further perspective 
The above description of the SMC shows that application of the model, up to now, does 
not aim to provide a welfare perspective on government regulation. However, such 
welfare perspective could be warranted as the ultimate purpose of regulation is to 
enhance welfare, e.g. by repairing market failure. That is why the remainder of this 
paper gives some suggestions how the SCM methodology – which is very flexible – 
could be extended to include some of these broader welfare aspects of government 
regulation. The upshot is that a simple reduction of the administrative burden, e.g. 
through less strict regulation or deregulation, does not necessarily imply a welfare gain 
for society. A good example of this is the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. This 
crisis is doubtless partly due to a lack of effective governmental supervision on the 
financial markets. To supervise financial markets, the supervisor needs information 
from the regulated financial businesses. The costs for the financial sector to comply 
with these information obligations are administrative burdens. Moreover, regulation 
also brings about costs for the financial industry as the regulated financial businesses 
are restricted in making decisions which are most profitable from the viewpoint of 
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merely their own interest. However, deregulation may enhance the risk of costly default. 
The case of the credit crisis shows that the welfare costs of such default can be 
rocketing high. Therefore, one of the boundary conditions of every policy to reduce 
administrative burdens should be the safeguarding of the related public goals. The 
transaction costs perspective of the next sections provides the link between the mere 
accounting methodology of the SCM to calculate costs associated with implementation 
of government regulation and the broader view on government regulation as a means to 
enhance welfare.  
Table 1: Administrative burden requirements safety advisor of the EU regulation, 
directive 96/35/EG, according to the Standard Cost Model methodology: The 
Netherlands, 2005 
IO Periodicity/event Tariff 
(internal 
advisors) 
Time 
(internal 
advisors)  
Price for 
IO 
(internal 
costs)  
Quantity Administrative 
burden  
(internal costs)  
Reporting 
accidents 
Event driven: 
accident 
68 euro 32 hours 
(average 
per 
business 
per year) 
2178 euro  2163 
domestic 
businesses 
4.7 million euro 
Making 
annual 
report 
Once a year 68 euro 16 hours 1089 euro  2163 
domestic 
businesses 
2.4 million euro 
All IOs      7.1 million euro 
Source: International SCM network, 2005a; adapted for this paper 
3. The transaction costs perspective 
The administrative burden of government regulation can be considered as part of the 
transaction costs that the regulation brings about. However, these transaction costs 
cover a much broader range of costs of government regulation than the costs for 
businesses to comply with information obligations of the regulations. Transaction costs 
of government regulation cover all direct and indirect costs that are to be made by 
11 
 
 
 
society when it is decided to restrict or regulate economic activities of businesses. Often 
such regulation is formed in the political process and aims at repairing market failures 
by internalizing externalities. Therefore, as mentioned before, from a societal point of 
view regulation is supposed to enhance welfare. However, the discussion in this section 
on the transaction costs of government regulation is confined to a classification of the 
various types of costs that come about, given the regulation. This classification uses the 
observation that the relationship between the government and the business sector in case 
of regulatory requirements can be seen as a principal/agent relationship, where the 
regulatory authority is the principal, and the businesses which have to comply with the 
regulations, are the agents. The classification of transaction costs that follows from this 
perspective is instrumental to see how the SCM can be extended to include all direct 
and indirect costs of government regulation.   
3.1 Transaction costs economics 
In order to do so, first, a short review is given on transaction costs economics, and on 
how transaction costs affect the working of the economy. Ronald Coase (1937) 
introduced the concept of transaction costs by describing these costs as ‘the costs of 
using the price mechanism in the market’. This concept was elaborated by Oliver 
Williamson, who defined transaction costs as the costs of running the economic system 
(see e.g. Williamson 1975; following Arrow, 1969). Nowadays the term transaction 
costs is used to describe all the costs incurred in setting up, making, and maintaining a 
transaction. Cheung (1987) describes transaction costs as all costs that are not 
conceivable in the so called ‘Robinson-Crusoe economy’. North and Wallis (1994) 
distinguish between transformation costs and transaction costs. Transformation costs are 
incurred when the physical attributes of a good or service are changed. Transaction 
costs, on the other hand, are incurred when the property rights on a good or service 
change. Therefore transaction costs defy the existence of a frictionless economy: the 
neoclassical paradigm is only valid when there are zero transaction costs (North, 1991). 
Positive transaction costs influence allocation decisions by reducing the profitability of 
transactions. Some transactions which would otherwise be utility increasing may not 
occur when transaction costs exist. This latter way of describing transaction costs 
provides a link with the transaction costs of government regulation. Clearly the costs 
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that are made, both by the government as by the business sector, can be seen as 
transaction costs, as they are the result of restrictions to the working of the market 
mechanism and do not relate to production costs. There is one exemption to this. In case 
substantive obligations force businesses to adapt their products according to certain 
norm or standards e.g. related to safety, the costs of these adaptations should be 
regarded as bonding costs. In section 3.2, we will argue that probably most costs of 
these types of adaptation will be internal bonding costs. Internal bonding costs are costs 
that would be made anyhow by businesses from their own commercial perspectives. If 
so, they should be subtracted from transaction costs again. Transaction costs also cause 
a distortion of optimal allocation – that is why it is important to keep transaction costs 
as low as possible – and can be seen as the consequence of the coordination which is 
needed to increase regulation effectiveness.  
For a proper classification of transaction costs of government regulation it is useful to 
distinguish between ‘hard’ or direct transaction costs and ‘soft’ or indirect transaction 
costs (see e.g. WRR, 2003). From the general perspective of trade transactions, hard 
transaction costs relate to costs that are readily perceptible and quantifiable, such as 
transport charges, import levies and customs authorities’ tariffs. Soft transaction costs 
are much more difficult to observe and measure. One can think of all kinds of costs of 
making and checking contracts, information costs, costs because of cultural differences 
and communication failures, tacit knowledge on legal procedures, formation of trust and 
reputation, network building, costs associated with risks and with rules and regulation in 
order to reduce risks, security requirements etc.  
This distinction between hard and soft transaction costs is of particular relevance for 
costs of government regulation, as the hard transaction costs (and benefits) mainly relate 
to the direct financial costs (and benefits like subsidies) and the soft transactions costs 
to the administrative burden (information compliance costs) and substantive compliance 
costs (and benefits) of regulations (See also Figure 1). Therefore, neither these hard 
transaction costs and the substantive compliance costs, nor the benefits are measured by 
the present main stream of the SCM. However, recently a new module of the SCM has 
been developed, called SIROCCO (Scanning InstRument Other Compliance COsts). 
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SIROCCO aims at measuring the direct costs of complying with substantive 
obligations. See also section 3.3.  
3.2 The principal/agent perspective on transaction costs 
In the principal/agent (agency) relation in the implementation of government regulation 
three types of costs can be distinguished which are all part of the total transaction costs 
of this regulation.  
The first type of costs is the costs for the government itself. These are, in the 
principal/agent terminology, the monitoring costs. Parts of these are administration or 
enforcing costs, but there are also additional costs which come with the design of the 
regulatory measures. Therefore, the implementation or enforcing costs for the 
government are generally considerably higher than the amounts which appear in the 
budget (payment of subsidies, receipts of levies). The additional costs include salaries 
of the civil servants engaged in policy preparation, implementation of regulatory 
measures and other monitoring activities. Costs also relate to subsidies which are not 
granted, and allowances for tax exemptions. Whereas the costs that appear explicitly in 
the budget can be seen as ‘hard’ transaction costs, the other costs are more difficult to 
quantify and can be seen as ‘soft’ transaction costs. They may, by the way, also appear 
in the budget, but implicitly. 
The second type of costs is the bonding costs for the citizens and businesses. These 
consist mainly of compliance costs. Here all compliance costs of the norm addressees as 
a consequence of the government regulation should be taken into account. They are the 
direct financial costs such as levies, but also capital investments and all other remaining 
costs needed to meet the obligations of laws and legislation. These compliance costs 
also include the costs of informing the government (sheer bonding costs), which can be 
regarded as the administrative burdens in a strict sense and which are the focus of the 
SCM methodology.  The policy debate on diminishing the administrative burden of 
government regulation usually focuses on these costs only. Calculating total compliance 
costs can, however, be rather complicated. For instance, when firms are to meet the 
requirements of environment legislation or of safety regulations, they have to make all 
kinds of investments in the production processes and management procedures of the 
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firm. These costs can only be partly counted as transaction costs of government policy, 
as some of these investment costs would be made anyhow from the own commercial 
perspective of the firm. So there is a need to separate these kinds of compliance costs in 
external compliance costs6, which are added to the transaction costs, and internal 
compliance costs7, which are not transaction costs originating from government 
regulation. Of course such a split between external and internal compliance costs has, to 
some extent, an arbitrary character and requires a good insight into the management of 
the firm. Boog and Nijsen (2007, see also Nijsen 2008) provide an example of how to 
calculate these various types of compliance costs for specific cases within the SCM 
framework.  
The third type of costs is much more difficult to quantify, namely the societal costs of 
the residual loss. These arise because the reaction of the agents to government 
regulation will never be in complete agreement with the objectives of the government. 
The difference is the residual loss. Principal/agents contracts should be designed in such 
a way that the total agency costs (monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss) are 
minimized. It implies that agency contracts should not focus on reducing only one 
particular type of costs, but there should be a good balance between all three types of 
costs.  
The above discussion shows that the principal/agent theory provides an adequate 
framework for a taxonomy and further categorisation of the transaction costs of 
implementing government regulation. Total transaction costs of government regulation 
consist of the netted sum of the three components. The expression ‘netted sum’ 
indicates that e.g. subsidies granted by the government to private agents are counted as 
costs by the government, but should be subtracted from the costs incurred by the private 
agents for obtaining the subsidy and the bonding costs made by these agents to 
demonstrate to the government that the subsidy is well spent. The opposite holds when 
government regulation aims at internalizing negative externalities and penalties are to 
be paid when restrictions to e.g. pollution or safety regulation are not met. In that case 
the penalties are part of the transaction costs of the private agents, but should be 
subtracted from the costs the government makes in order to monitor the regulation and 
to implement it in an effective way.  
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3.3 Extension of the Standard Cost Model 
The question now is how this classification of transaction costs can be used for an 
extension of the SCM so that all costs of government regulation are taken into account. 
Table 2 demonstrates how the different concepts of the transaction costs perspective and 
the SCM relate to each other.   
16 
 
 
 
Table 2: Concepts of transaction costs perspective and SCM compared 
 
Perspective B. Transaction 
Costs 
 
  
A. Standard Cost Model     
 1.Monitoring Costs: 
government 
2.Bonding Costs: 
regulated 
businesses; internal 
costs 
3.Bonding Costs: 
regulated 
businesses; 
external costs 
4.Residual 
Losses: 
society 
1.Enforcing Costs: 
government 
A1 part of B1    
2.Informational Compliance 
Costs: regulated businesses 
  A2 part of B3  
3.Financial Compliance 
Costs: regulated businesses 
  A3 part of B3  
4.Substantive Compliance 
Costs: regulated 
businesses/business as usual 
costs 
 A4 part of B2   
5.Substantive Compliance 
Costs: regulated 
businesses/marginal costs 
  A5 part of B3  
6.Costs of inefficient 
compliance: regulated 
businesses 
   A6 part of 
B4 
7.Secondary Compliance 
Effects: all businesses 
    A7 part of 
B4 
Green = object of main stream SCM/MISTRAL® 
Yellow = object of SCM/SIROCCO 
Grey = object of SCM/MISTRAL® on ad hoc base only 
Orange = not object of SCM 
 
The distinction of the costs in the principal/agent relation can be helpful to come to a 
list of additional cost categories with which the SCM could be extended. From table 2 it 
appears that the transaction costs perspective and the main stream SCM only have the 
informational compliance costs (A2: administrative burden = green) in common. All the 
other components of the transaction costs theory are either: 
• included in SCM/SIROCCO like the substantive compliance costs (A4 and A5, 
yellow), or in an ad hoc implementation of the SCM like the enforcing costs of 
government (A1, grey) 
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• or, not included at all in any of the variants of the SCM like the financial 
compliance costs (A3), the cost of inefficient compliance (A6) and all secondary 
compliance effects (A7) (orange) 
To resume, there is evidence that the SCM is equipped to integrate the substantive 
compliance costs of the regulated businesses or norm addressees, and the enforcing 
costs of the government. The SCM allows for subtracting the internal bonding costs or 
‘business as usual costs’ from the transaction costs. Related to the enforcing costs of the 
government, the question remains what types of costs should be included in the SCM: 
the monitoring costs in strict sense only, which are related directly to the informational 
compliance costs of the regulated businesses? Or should additional costs of the 
government related to the design of the regulatory measures, the costs of not granted 
subsidies and allowances for tax exemptions, and the costs of the payment of subsidies 
by the government also be included?  
The most challenging question is: how to extend the main stream SCM with financial 
compliance costs, the costs of inefficient compliance and all secondary compliance 
effects? The first two cost components – financial compliance costs and the costs of 
inefficient compliance – are regulatory costs of the regulated businesses or norm 
addressees.  
First, the inclusion of financial compliance costs of the regulated businesses in the 
SCM. This type of costs relates to the payment of taxes or premiums by the regulated 
businesses. The receipt of these payments is on the (national) budget. In principle, it 
will be possible to extend the SCM with the direct financial costs of the regulated 
businesses. However, the question remains, whether it will appear feasible to separate 
the taxes and premiums in the (national) budget paid by the specific group of regulated 
businesses or norm addressees out of the total amount of paid taxes and premiums.  
An interesting case study which includes a specific type of financial compliance costs is 
the calculation by the Economic Institute for the Building Industry (EIB) in the 
Netherlands (Jansen and Vrolijk, 2008), of the compliance costs of specialized building 
contractors. The EIB calculation focuses on the ‘Wet Ketenaansprakelijkheid (WKa) 
(Law on ultimate responsibility for payments of taxes and social security 
contributions)’. The WKa is a rule that makes the specialized building contractor 
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responsible for collecting the taxes and social security premiums that are to be paid for 
all employees who are working on a project. The reason is that specialized building 
contractors often use a number of subcontractors, which makes it difficult for the tax 
authorities to collect taxes separately from all of these subcontractors, specified per 
project. The EIB uses a methodology for calculating the compliance costs which is 
similar to the SCM model. However, the EIB pays special attention to the computation 
of the substantive compliance costs. These costs are separated into (i) costs caused by 
lost capital benefits, (ii) finance costs and (iii) costs for using a G-account. Costs caused 
by lost capital benefits come about because businesses are forced to use G-accounts. A 
G-account is a bank account that can only be used to make payments to the tax collector 
office or to the building contractor who has final responsibility for tax payments. The 
use of this G-account reduces the financial potential of building contractors, because the 
money that is blocked on the G-account cannot be used for other financial purposes. So 
the costs lost by capital benefits are the opportunity costs of not being able to use 
blocked money on the G-account for other purposes. In the measurement of the EIB 
these opportunity costs are included in the measurement of the finance costs which are 
the missed returns on the money blocked on the G-account. Here a sensitivity analysis is 
conducted with respect to the rate of return of these blocked money assets. This case 
study shows that the way financial compliance costs can be included in the SCM 
methodology depends very much on the specific institutional set-up of the regulatory 
measures. 
The second problem to deal with in extending the SCM is the inclusion of the costs of 
inefficient compliance of the regulated businesses in the SCM. This appears to be a 
major problem that challenges one of the core principles of the SCM. A major reason 
for the success and applicability of the SCM is the assumption of compliance in a 
‘normally efficient way’. This assumption relates to the main goal of the SCM: taking 
away unnecessary administrative burden. Reducing administrative burden caused by 
inefficient compliance, is not the responsibility of the government. That’s why this 
category of administrative burden is out of scope when implementing the SCM. In the 
beginning of this article, it was argued the main argument for integrating transaction 
costs theory and SCM is, optimizing net benefits for society by improving the process 
of law making. The new instrument – let’s name it the SCM extended – will be an 
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instrument for public officers especially. For this reason, our advice will be not to 
extend the SCM with the costs of inefficient compliance. The same holds for the fact 
that the SCM does not consider businesses that spent time about how to circumvent the 
regulations or to show that the regulatory regime did not apply to them. Our advice will 
be not to include these types of business costs. Related to this is the issue of incomplete 
compliance with substantive obligations, especially category A5 in table 2. The main 
stream SCM reckons full compliance with information obligations, viz. all regulated 
businesses are supposed to comply with all IOs. In order to assess residual losses from 
the perspective of transaction costs theory, it might be advisable to extend the SCM 
with a module to reckon incomplete compliance especially related to substantive 
obligations. This would allow assessing residual losses in case the reactions of the 
regulated businesses (agents) do not fully meet the objectives of the government. This 
will be the case, if not all businesses but just a minor part of them are complying. The 
societal costs of the residual loss can only be estimated when the government’s 
objectives are quantified as targets and when costs can be attributed to the extent that 
the result of government regulation differs from the target. These types of costs are hard 
to quantify. 
Finally, the extension of the SCM with the secondary compliance effects for all 
businesses. If the direct costs and benefits for the regulated businesses or norm 
addressees are available, macro-economic models will allow calculating the secondary 
effects for the whole economy. So from a conceptual point of view this extension is not 
a problem. However, it may be hard to find and use an adequate macroeconomic model 
that is actually capable of calculating these secondary (or general equilibrium) effects.  
Some methodological issues are still left to be discussed. Regarding the distinction hard 
versus soft transaction costs, the parameter Time in the SCM covers all soft transaction 
costs as far as it belongs to a normally efficient way of compliance. Basically, the SCM 
follows Sandford’s ‘lawyers’ concept’. The lawyers’ concept implies, administrative 
burden and substantive compliance cost are: “the cost which a reasonable man would 
incur” (Sandford et.al., 1989, pp.12). This implies that the SCM not just measures the 
time spent in order to comply with the information or substantive obligation as such, but 
also the other parts of soft transaction costs, such as time spent on discussions and 
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preparation of management decisions about how to comply with government regulation. 
The list of standard administrative activities available as one of the instrumental parts of 
the SCM allows for measuring time and costs for this part of soft transaction costs. In 
principle, the list of standard activities could be extended with all soft transaction costs 
which rise from the principal/agent relationship. Examples are the costs of making and 
checking contracts, the costs of communication failures or costs regarding tacit 
knowledge or reputation of civil servants and businesses’ employees.8  
The measurement of the transaction costs related to bonding in SCM is somewhat 
problematic. Since bonding costs consist of external (A5, table 2) and internal (A4, 
table 2) compliance costs, only external compliance costs should be included in order to 
measure the costs caused by government regulation. However internal (business as 
usual costs) and external (marginal or incremental costs) compliance costs are difficult 
to separate, but when they are both included in the calculation, it overestimates the total 
transaction costs (UK Government, 2008). Yet, the business as usual costs of financial 
obligations and IOs are zero to almost zero. No entrepreneur would pay or inform 
government if there was no legal requirement to do so. An important condition is a 
sharp distinction between information obligations and substantive obligations. Business 
as usual costs are very common when dealing with substantive obligations. We note that 
the measurement of substantive compliance costs like investments, inclusive the 
separation between business as usual and marginal costs, is subject of the latest module 
of Mistral®, named SIROCCO (Nijsen et.al., 2008).  
Table 3 summarizes all types of hard and soft transaction costs of government 
regulation that can be distinguished from the perspective of the principal/agent 
relationship.   
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Table 3: Hard and soft transaction costs in the principal/agent relationship 
 
Monitoring costs of 
government 
Bonding costs of 
businesses 
Societal costs of the 
residual loss of 
government, 
businesses, and 
civilians 
Hard transaction costs  Salaries of civil 
servants and subsidies  
Payments of taxes or 
levies  
Salaries paid in order to 
comply with 
government regulation 
while the government’s 
objective is not being 
achieved  
Soft transaction costs  Information costs, costs 
of making and checking 
contracts etc.  
-Costs of complying 
with information 
obligations  
- Marginal costs of 
complying with 
substantive obligations  
-Costs of losses in tacit 
knowledge, costs of 
making, checking and 
renewing contracts  
-Costs of 
communication failures, 
risks, or costs or gains 
in reputation  
Soft transaction costs of 
government policy 
resulting from the 
difference between 
government regulation 
and the government’s 
targets  
 
Just to give an impression about the problems and possibilities when the SCM should be 
extended to include all costs of table 3, we will discuss some topics.  
First, the hard transaction costs as far it concerns the monitoring and bonding costs are 
rather easy to integrate in the SCM. These are part of the government’s budgets. More 
difficult will be the assessment of the societal costs of the residual loss, viz. the salaries 
paid in order to comply with government regulation while the government’s objective is 
not being achieved. Several questions occur. When and how do you know a 
government’s objective is not being achieved? How do you find the degree of 
compliance by the regulated businesses and enforcement by the responsible government 
institution? Etcetera. 
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Second, soft transaction costs with respect to the monitoring costs of government can be 
estimated by calculating the time spent on information searches, making decisions 
based on information and the time spent on making and checking contracts. These costs 
relate to the interaction between government and businesses, such as regularly 
monitoring business behaviour. These costs can be measured in a similar way as the 
costs of complying with information requirements. Time spent is all time required for 
coping with these monitoring activities, which includes time for informal 
communication and for preparatory meetings. So here some of the salary paid for the 
persons involved in these activities can be seen as soft transaction costs.  
Soft transaction costs concerning the bonding costs of businesses are harder to measure, 
since these costs have a more fuzzy character than monitoring costs. These costs consist 
of losses in tacit knowledge or costs or gains of reputation. Losses in tacit knowledge 
can be measured by measuring the situation before and after the obligation. The 
difference is the loss in tacit knowledge. Yet valuing such losses hinges very much on 
subjective judgment. Costs with respect to making, checking and renewing contracts 
and communication failures are less difficult to quantify. These costs can be measured 
in the same way as the soft transaction costs with respect to the monitoring costs. The 
costs of inefficient compliance are hard to measure.  
Before, it is indicated how hard it is to measure the societal costs of the residual loss. It 
seems appropriate to only give a qualitative impression of these costs and include these 
costs as pm in the estimate of total costs of government regulation. 
4. The cost/benefit perspective on government regulation 
The presentations of the previous sections of the transaction costs of government 
regulation take existing regulations as given. It allows focusing on the costs of 
regulation, which is in line with political pressure (and pressure from the business 
sector) to come to a reduction of the administrative burden of government regulation. 
However, government regulation aims at enhancing social welfare so that the benefits of 
regulation should exceed the costs. Usually the argument for government regulation is 
to repair market failure. This is, for instance, the case with environmental regulation, or 
regulation with respect to safety measures. The benefits of such regulation are not 
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always directly visible and often relate to long term benefits for society, whereas the 
direct costs are more tangible, and are borne by specific stakeholders, the norm 
addressees or – more specific – the regulated businesses. The obligation to comply with 
environmental standards, for example, does not seem to bring benefits for businesses, 
but these standards are set by the government in order to prevent negative external 
effects, which would otherwise be harmful to society, and in an indirect way, also for 
the business sector.  Even the benefits of pure financial regulations are not always 
directly visible or easy to measure. An example is the obligation for companies to 
publish an annual report. What are the benefits? In this case such reports reduce the 
transaction costs for those that want to obtain information on the financial position and 
strategic behaviour of the companies, for instance when they are involved in business 
transactions with these companies, or want to buy shares. Then, it is useful when the 
financial reporting is conducted according to some international standard, which makes 
the interpretation of the financial position more transparent. But these benefits for 
society are difficult, if not impossible to quantify.  
Yet, in order to come to a judgment on how much government regulation is needed in a 
specific situation, some kind of cost/benefit analysis should be conducted. More 
specifically, in such cost/benefit analysis the net benefits of alternative ways of 
regulation should be judged against the null-alternative of the existing regulation. The 
extended SCM methodology can be used for the cost part of such cost/benefit analysis, 
but other formal model-based or informal methods should be developed for calculating 
the benefits. Note that in the Netherlands, model based calculations made by the CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis on the economic effects of policy 
measures carry a large weight in the process of political decision making (see e.g. Den 
Butter, 2006). Similarly, model based calculations could be conducted to estimate the 
benefits of regulation. 
In a cost/benefit analysis (Connolly and Munro, 1999), two problems arise. These 
problems concern (i) the distribution of costs and benefits, and (ii) finding all 
stakeholders involved. The distribution problem is a core problem of economic welfare 
and will even occur when all stakeholders benefit from the new regulation (or change in 
regulation) so that it can be considered a Pareto-improvement. But more often the 
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distribution problem arises because the benefits for one party go along with costs for 
another party. Therefore it needs to be considered whether the losses for certain groups 
of interest are acceptable or not (when the netted sum is positive, an opportunity for a 
Kaldor-Hicks-improvement exists). The other problem is to identify all stakeholders 
which are really affected in a negative or positive way by the regulation.  
The benefits of government regulation can accrue to the business sector and/or to 
society as a whole. The next subparagraph discusses the benefits for the business sector 
and the following paragraph the benefits for the society.  
4.1 Benefits of government regulation for businesses 
Government regulation may, in spite of the costs involved, bring benefits to the business 
sector, as it may enhance positive externalities or reduce negative externalities. An 
example is the case that information about businesses has to be made openly available. 
It makes the search costs for business partners decrease and business partners can be 
trusted more easily (because they have more information about their partners and it can 
cause a costly loss of reputation when their partners cheat). A similar argument holds 
for businesses that have to comply with environmental standards. The fact that they are 
able and willing to comply with these standards, will enhance their reputation with 
certain customers, while other businesses, which do not comply with the standards, will 
lose their reputation in society. Because of this a competitive situation rises, which 
stimulates the businesses to comply with government policy. The stronger government 
policy is, the stronger the reputation will be when businesses comply with the 
government policy.  
A recent example of government regulation which uses this reputation mechanism is the 
Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) certificate. Here businesses which fulfil certain 
standards of reliability are granted the rights of the AEO-certificate so that they are to 
deal with fewer legal procedures and inspections (European Commission Directorate-
General Taxation and Customs Union (2007). Since September 2007 all businesses (as 
long as they comply with all guidelines for getting the AEO-certificate) can apply for 
becoming an Authorized Economic Operator. Starting in July 2009, AEO-businesses 
will be given even more advantages. They will get additional information on when 
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inspections will take place and they will be allowed to give less information than other 
businesses without AEO-certificate. This will make the certificate even more valuable 
so that the costs of cheating and loss of the certificate are higher. The reputation effect 
of the AEO-certificate is much related to the number of businesses who are certified, so 
that it brings about network externalities. Therefore the government should facilitate 
that businesses obtain such certificates. In this case the EU-governments should 
facilitate it, as it is essential that the AEO-certificate is accepted EU-wide in order to 
further increase the value of the AEO-certificate.   
4.2 Benefits of government regulation for society 
The most obvious benefits of government regulation are to be found with the society, as 
the main argument for regulation is to internalize external effects. The example of 
setting environmental standards in order to prevent environmental damage has already 
been mentioned. The benefits could be measured by calculating the abatement costs in 
case of no regulation, or by valuation methods of environmental quality. A problem 
here is that the benefits of environmental standards will have a world wide influence so 
that international agreements on specific external effects have to be made.  
Another benefit of government regulation for society is that the regulation sets 
standards for the quality of the products and enhances the knowledge of the quality of 
the products. Warranty and quality marks protect customers against bad products. 
Without the government policy this would be less or not possible and businesses would 
have too much power. Yet such quality standards and information on quality can also be 
provided by clubs and NGO’s like consumer organizations.  
4.3 What can the government do to come to ‘optimal’ regulation?  
When the SCM measures the costs of existing regulation, it provides the government 
with information on the administrative burden of that regulation9. Moreover, when the 
SCM is extended and reckons with all transaction costs resulting from the 
principal/agent relationship between the regulator and the business sector, a split-up is 
made between monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss. It allows the 
government to decide whether to make the implementation of the existing regulation 
more efficient, e.g. by a decrease of bonding costs. That will reduce the administrative 
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burden associated with the regulation, but it may, at the same time, involve more 
monitoring costs, so that the welfare effect of such change in the implementation is 
ambiguous. So, in fact, the government should consider only changes in the 
implementation of existing regulation which make the total transaction costs go down. 
The extended version of the SCM is a useful tool in that decision making process. As is 
described above, an interesting example of how transaction costs both for the business 
sector and for the government can be reduced is the provision of the AEO certificate. 
This certificate uses the reputation mechanism and the trust game as devices to reduce 
transaction costs of government regulation. Yet, as up to now not many businesses have 
solicited for, and obtained this AEO-certificate. The benefits of the AEO-certificate 
(which  are the reduction of the delay caused by custom formalities and inspections, the 
reputation effect and the resulting network externalities) are still rather small. Therefore, 
the government should make the certificate more attractive in this start-up period. More 
in general, the reputation mechanism and the costs involved in loosing the reputation 
could be used more often in the implementation of government regulation in order to 
reduce transaction costs. 
The introduction of an AEO-certificate can also be regarded as a change in the 
regulation itself. In that case the existing regulation is no longer considered as given, 
but the aim of the government becomes to come to a kind of ‘optimal’ regulation. Here 
‘optimal’ implies that the benefits minus the costs of the regulation are as high as 
possible. In a cost/benefit analysis the null-alternative of the existing regulation is to be 
compared with alternative regulatory measures. For instance, less regulation can be one 
alterative in the analysis. The (extended) SCM can provide an estimate about how much 
reduction of transaction costs this alternative with less regulation yields. On the other 
hand, less regulation will probably also imply a reduction of benefits, for instance 
because a lack of a safety regulation increases the risk of accidents.  Therefore, in order 
to come to a welfare enhancing revision of existing regulation, the government should 
carefully ponder the costs and benefits. A further problem is that costs and benefits, and 
hence the changes in costs and benefits, will affect different stakeholders. Lobbies and 
discussions about compensation may complicate the decision making process and, in 
the end, enhance the transaction costs of implementation the new regulation. That’s why 
a careful set-up for the consultation and negotiation about the regulation is needed, 
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involving all relevant stakeholders. Transaction costs of implementation can be 
substantially lower when the result of the consultation and negotiation is that 
stakeholders have an intrinsic motivation to comply with the regulation, than that the 
regulation can only be followed by extrinsic motivation through strict monitoring and 
fear of high fines (see also Müller and Nijsen, 2008).     
5. Conclusion 
Implementation of government regulation brings about transaction costs. These costs 
are often neglected in the design and discussion of government policy, but can be 
substantial. As regulation brings about a principal/agent relationship with the regulator 
as principal and the private economic entities that have to comply with the regulation as 
agents, three types of transaction costs can be distinguished, namely (i) monitoring costs 
of the principal (in casu the regulator); (ii) bonding costs by the regulated private 
economic entities (in casu the business sector) and (iii) the costs of residual loss in case 
the result of the regulation is not in conformity with the targets set by the regulating 
authorities. The monitoring and bonding costs both comprise so called ‘hard’ 
transaction costs, which are direct costs and relatively easy to quantify, and ‘soft’ 
transaction costs, which are indirect costs and hard, or even impossible, to quantify. The 
costs of residual loss are welfare losses, and can for that reason also be considered as 
‘soft’ transaction costs.   
This paper elaborates the distinction between these various types of transaction costs in 
order to provide a blueprint for their measurement in case of regulation of the business 
sector. A starting point is the Standard Cost Model (SCM) which measures bonding 
costs. Part of the bonding costs are the administrative burden of private sector 
businesses, a topic much under discussion nowadays as the burden is considered too 
high and hampers the activities of the business sector. There are also experiences with 
measuring the monitoring costs and bonding costs related to production standards and 
norms by the implementation of the SCM. The SCM can be instrumental in measuring 
the success of changes in the implementation of regulation which aims at reducing the 
administrative burden. However a fuller picture results, when the SCM is extended to 
include all transaction costs, both of the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ types, distinguished in this 
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paper. This paper contains a number of suggestions on how to include these additional 
costs in the SCM. 
However, government regulation is not solely a nuisance but has a reason. The main 
argument for government regulation stems from the theory of public sector economics 
and considers regulation a necessary instrument to internalize external effects. 
Therefore, in the design of ‘optimal’ regulation, the regulator has to make a cost/benefit 
analysis, which compares the societal benefits of the regulation with the costs 
stakeholders have to bear. The ‘optimal’ regulation is that regulation with the highest 
net benefits, which may differ from the regulation - in extremis: no regulation - with the 
lowest costs. For such cost/benefit analysis, the costs can be calculated using the 
extended SCM. Therefore a scope for future research is to elaborate the blueprint of this 
paper and apply the methodology to various cases. For quantification of the benefits of 
government regulation a methodology is needed which uses a welfare theoretic 
framework. Here the (official) guidelines in the Netherlands of how to conduct a 
cost/benefit analysis for policy proposals can be used as starting point (see Eijgenraam 
et al., 2000). Such an analysis also provides insight in the welfare effects for the various 
stakeholders in the regulation. A suggestion that stems from an experiment with AEO-
certification is that reputation effects and creating intrinsic motivation to comply with 
the regulation should be used in order to keep transaction costs down.           
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Endnotes 
                                                            
1
 Resp. Professor of Economics, VU University Amsterdam, Graduate Student VU University, former 
director of Panteia Zoetermeer/The Netherlands and author of the Standard Cost Model. At  present 
André Nijsen is independent adviser regulatory reform.  
2
 The authors thank professor Ig Snellen for his valuable comments 
3
 In 2008, the Dutch Regulatory Reform Group decided to exclude third party disclosures from the base 
line measurement of administrative burden in 2007. The reason is that third party disclosures are being 
considered to be substantive obligations and not information obligations in the sense of monitoring costs. 
So, the newest version of the SCM is in line again with Mistral® as far as third party disclosures concern. 
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4
 It is interesting to realise that the first implementation of Mistral® also considered the related enforcing 
costs for the government (Bosch et.al. 1993). Besides, there exist several implementations of the SCM in 
the area of information compliance costs of civilians and government.  
5
 In case of event driven IOs, the number of regulated businesses is removed from the formula, since only 
the total number of events matters  
6
 According to the SCM also called marginal costs or incremental costs of regulations. See Figure 1 
7
 According to the SCM, also called ‘business as usual costs’. See Figure 1 
8
 Therefore some special provisions may be needed to cover costs regarding tacit knowledge or reputation 
of civil servants and business employees 
9
 The SCM is also applied to assess the administrative burden of planned or new regulations. In this case, 
the SCM is part of a RIA (Regulatory Impact Assessment) of BIA (Business Impact Assessment) 
